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MODELLING INNOVATION AND THE MACROECONOMICS OF LOW-CARBON 
TRANSITIONS: THEORY, PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICAL USE  
Abstract: Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly 
assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their 
conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. 
This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in different 
macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. 
We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into 
two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-
consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon 
policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary 
and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. 
Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy 
making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions 
reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the 
transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate 
policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall “black box” critique, much-cited in policy circles and 
elsewhere. 
Key policy insights: 
 Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts 
of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations. 
 The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on 
the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with 
processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change. 
 Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-
environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-
related policies.  
 All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their 
treatment of finance and innovation. 
 A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their 
representations of money and finance. 
Keywords: economics of innovation; innovation policy; finance of innovation; economic modelling; 
climate policy; finance of low-carbon investment 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate and energy targets could be met via different pathways and combinations of supply-side 
and demand-side technological and socioeconomic options. Significant debate exists on strategies 
for achieving an efficient and cost-effective sustainable energy transition (Stern 2007, Edenhofer et 
al. 2010, Nordhaus 2010, IPCC 2014b, Kriegler et al. 2014, Nordhaus 2015, Rogelj et al. 2015, Rogelj 
et al. 2018). Macro-models are used extensively in this context to inform policy-making, notably 
through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) process (IPCC 2014b), and in 
national, European and international policy-making.1   
Following the recent context of economic instability in many countries across the globe, it is of 
primary importance to determine whether climate policies will hinder or boost economic growth, 
lead to unsustainable debt levels, generate economic opportunity or impose an economic burden 
(Stern 2007, Stern 2015, Mercure et al. 2016b). 2 Innovation as a driver of economic activity is a 
recurrent theme in current discourses on economic development (BIS 2011, OECD 2015, European 
Commission 2017), as well as public and private aggregate debt (McLeay et al. 2014b, a, Mazzucato 
2018), This particularly relates to low-carbon and energy innovation, which could either fuel future 
prosperity or become an economic burden, its scale being sufficiently large to influence the 
macroeconomy.  
Energy-economy-environment (E3) models are typically designed to inform policy-makers on 
technology or economic scenarios for achieving low-carbon transformations. However, they do not 
currently address in the required detail some of the key features of low-carbon innovation, 
including the necessary investment and finance of technology transitions, leaving unanswered 
questions for actual policy application (Grubb et al. 2014, Mercure et al. 2016b, Pollitt and Mercure 
2017). As we show here, consensus has never been reached over how to treat innovation and 
technological change, and financing, in basic economic theory. Since underlying model assumptions 
on such theory determine model outcomes and policy recommendations, results are often opposite 
for different models (see e.g. Carbon Trust 2005, Edenhofer et al. 2010, Cambridge Econometrics 
2013, 2015). This is an issue that has been debated for many years (Grubb et al. 1993, Grubb et al. 
2002, Grubb et al. 2006) While there is an ongoing debate on how to improve the realism of 
technological change and agent behaviour by using model experiments (Holtz et al. 2015, Li et al. 
2015, McCollum et al. 2016, Trutnevyte 2016, Li and Strachan 2017, Pettifor et al. 2017, McCollum 
et al. 2018a), none of these experiments challenge representations of investment, money and 
finance. 
This problem reflects partly the underestimation of the role of finance and money on the real 
economy (Minsky 1986, Guttmann 2016, Monasterolo and Raberto 2018), including stranded 
assets (McGlade and Ekins 2015, Mercure et al. 2018b) or assets at risk from climate change and 
climate policy (Bank of England 2015, Carney 2015, Battiston et al. 2017, Campiglio et al. 2018), and 
partly the difficulty in modelling energy-related innovation, technological change and the 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, the several macro-modelling studies commissioned by the Directorate-General for Climate Action or the 
Directorate-General for Energy at the European Commission that have fed into the impact assessments underpinning their 2020, 2030 
and 2050 EU climate and energy strategies. E.g. see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020/studies_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030/documentation_en.htm  
2 See (Rogelj et al. 2013, Clarke et al. 2014, Kriegler et al. 2015a, Kriegler et al. 2015b, McCollum et al. 2018b) for recent engineering 
estimates of mitigation costs/investment. 
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effectiveness of policy instruments (Mercure et al. 2016b). Few of the current E3 models (e.g. as in 
GEA 2012, IPCC 2014b, Kriegler et al. 2014) have representations of the financial sector, its 
relevance for a large scale decarbonisation transition and its impact on the macroeconomy. This is 
a major shortcoming because such a transition will require large-scale investment in non-traditional 
sectors (Pollitt and Mercure 2017) and put at risk existing investment and assets (Bank of England 
2015, Carney 2015, Battiston et al. 2017, Mercure et al. 2018b). It also requires a much better 
understanding of the complex behaviour of agents and their response to policy incentives than 
what currently exists in the community (Knobloch and Mercure 2016). While the need for a more 
explicit representation of the financial sector in macroeconomic models has been widely discussed 
after the 2007 global financial crisis (e.g. for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models 
as they are used by central banks), such a discussion in the context of climate policy has yet to take 
place. 
In this paper, we review current modelling methodologies for assessing energy and climate policies. 
We provide a critical comparative analysis of various approaches to modelling policy-induced 
energy innovation and technological change, in order to better inform policy-makers and users of 
modelling results. We aim to answer important climate and energy policy questions: can policy and 
governance accelerate rates of low-carbon technology substitution, innovation and energy 
efficiency changes? Will this help or hinder economic development? And, do models accurately 
capture the impacts of investment that result from the use of chosen policy instruments?  
For this purpose, we identify features and factors in theory and models that result in particular 
modelling outcomes. This requires looking at their underlying theoretical basis and methodological 
assumptions: how do we currently understand innovation? Several reviews on the representation 
of energy-related innovation in E3 models have been written (Grubb et al. 2002, Löschel 2002, 
Köhler et al. 2006, Popp 2006, Clarke et al. 2008, Gillingham et al. 2008, Baccianti and Löschel 2014, 
Hall and Buckley 2016). However, none of these reviews cover the theoretical underpinnings of the 
various existing implementations, especially with regards to finance. Furthermore, many analyses 
have been made of how innovation may be induced by prices or policy  (Goulder and Schneider 
1999, Popp 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2012, Nordhaus 2014, Goulder et al. 2016), going back to 
Nordhaus (1973) and Hicks (1932), but again, these do not cover the role of money and finance in 
technological change. We note that the various model families have not converged at all to our 
knowledge over the years. It is also correct to say that nearly no attention has been given to 
representations of money and finance in models, particularly in the field of energy-economy 
modelling (Grubb et al. 1993, Grubb et al. 2002, Grubb et al. 2006), as computational experiments 
with finance have been made outside of the field (Battiston et al. 2016, Haldane and Turrell 2018).  
In Section two, we review how innovation and finance are addressed in recent economic theory 
and models. Section three shows how different underlying theories imply different perspectives on 
the macro-economic effects of policies, how this can be considered in policy-making, and under 
which conditions models could converge. Section four concludes and proposes a research agenda 
covering key gaps in the future energy-environment-economy modelling of low-carbon transitions. 
The Supplementary Material (SM) provides more information on the models used in this work.  
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2. MATERIALS AND METHODS: INNOVATION IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND MODELS 
2.1. TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
Economic theory can be roughly grouped into two different schools, each with different 
perspectives on innovation and the macroeconomy: equilibrium economics and non-equilibrium 
economics. 
The equilibrium economics school explains finance, innovation and productivity change based on 
Post-Walrasian neoclassical economics (Arrow 1962, Romer 1986, Solow 1986, Aghion et al. 1998, 
Acemoglu 2002). The central assumption is that prices coordinate the actions of all agents that 
adjust so as to equilibrate the markets for production factors (labour, capital/finance, knowledge, 
etc). The decisions of representative agents (usually one per economic activity) ensure that given 
technology and resource constraints and market imperfections (labour unemployment), all 
remaining factors are always fully employed in the most efficient way, determining the state of the 
economy. This underpins most models used to assess energy-economy issues in the climate change 
community (e.g. Capros et al. 2014, Clarke et al. 2014, Kriegler et al. 2014, Kriegler et al. 2015a, 
Nordhaus 2017). 
In the non-equilibrium economics school, the economy is seen as being in perpetual dynamical 
change. At its heart is Schumpeter’s foundational work3 on the role of the entrepreneur and of the 
enabling financial institutions (Schumpeter 1934, Schumpeter 1939, 2014), and Keynes’ analysis of 
investment and macroeconomic dynamics (Keynes 1936), which has been extended by the ‘Post-
Keynesians’ into a comprehensive theory of macroeconomics (e.g. Lavoie 2014). Models that focus 
on money and finance follow this theoretical underpinning (e.g. Dafermos et al. 2017, Bovari et al. 
2018, Lamperti et al. 2018, Mercure et al. 2018a, Monasterolo and Raberto 2018). 
We summarise here how economic development and productivity change is understood to take 
place for both schools.  A more extensive review of the treatment of innovation throughout the 
history of economic thought is given in (Mercure et al. 2016a). 
The basic view of the equilibrium school is one of optimal allocation of scarce economic resources 
given technology at each point in time, and of optimal capital accumulation over time (Figure 1 
left): 
1. Firms produce by fully using all available production factors (full employment of capital)4 to 
meet the demand for their products, given the technology options and households' 
preferences for consumption.  
2. Firms decide on investment that maximises their net present value, and seek financing from 
the capital market, which the interest rate clears.  
                                                 
3 Schumpeter’s telling representation of innovation has resurfaced in various forms throughout modern economics, for example in 
Endogenous Growth Theory (Aghion et al. 1998), Evolutionary Economics (Freeman and Louçã 2001), Sustainability Transitions Theory 
(Geels 2002), Energy Technology Innovation Systems (Hekkert et al. 2007, Grubler and Wilson 2013), directed clean innovation 
(Acemoglu 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2012), and ‘planetary economics’ (Grubb et al. 2014).  
 
4 This reflects a standard assumption in textbook models. Contemporary equilibrium theory can allow for partial employment, market 
imperfections, oligopolisitic competition (Dixon and Jorgenson 2013). 
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3. Firms' revenues from selling products are paid out to households, according to their provision 
of labour and capital ownership to the production process. Based on an intertemporal utility 
maximisation, households choose how to allocate this income between consumption (of 
various goods) and saving5. 
4. Savings are used to finance firms' investments. Investment accumulation defines the capital 
stock available for production, which includes: physical production facilities (e.g. new 
factories, replacement of retired machinery etc.), and investments into knowledge stock (e.g. 
technical progress, R&D). 
5. The increased amount of capital, labour (population) and their improved factor productivity 
(resulting from R&D expenditure) expand the production frontier, which allows higher 
volumes of production. 
 
Figure 1: Contrasting representations of economic growth in the Post-Keynesian/Post-Schumpeterian (non-equilibrium) 
schools to the neoclassical (equilibrium) school. 
Meanwhile, the non-equilibrium school contends that economic development takes place through 
entrepreneurial activity and the creation of purchasing power by banks (Figure 1 right): 
1. Entrepreneurs sense where potential demand is not satisfied and see potential applications 
for their ideas. They apply to financial institutions to finance their innovative improvements 
to the existing capital stock. Banks offer loans and create deposits, based on entrepreneurs’ 
credit-worthiness and the expected profitability of the investment project. 
2. Bank-funded investment in new capital involves R&D expenditure in various connected 
technologies and sectors, which increases their productivity. 
3. Productivity improvements reduce production costs. This can result in a mixture of (1) profits 
for the entrepreneurs and (2) price reductions in consumer markets. Both result in higher 
income for households, higher demand for the new products, and/or (3) reduced imports, 
and/or (4) increased exports. 
4. Higher income leads to higher effective demand (for all products) and higher saving. 
                                                 
5 We note the distinction between saving (the action of not spending a fraction of income) and savings (a certain amount of accumulated 
wealth). Here we use the verb saving, which implies a yearly flow of income not spent on consumption. 
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5. Higher demand and profits incentivise firms to re-invest in R&D and to expand their capital 
stock. 
These two representations are radically different in their key principles and lead to contrasting 
approaches when implemented quantitatively, with opposite directions in the flow of information:  
In the equilibrium school, a representative agent maximises utility by allocating fixed resources 
between possible uses, so that the methodology is generally tied to constrained optimisation 
(optimisation henceforth; every point in time is optimal and in a steady state within its context). In 
this perspective, the economy is driven by its ability to produce (supply-led). 
In the non-equilibrium school, the state of the economy at every time step primarily depends on its 
states in previous time steps and expectations of the future and financial resources are 
unconstrained, so that the methodology is generally tied to dynamical systems simulations 
(simulation henceforth). In that perspective, the economy is driven by demand (demand-led). These 
are independent traditions of mathematics research, often pursued independently from one 
another.  
While the simulation/optimisation terminology may be neither exhaustive nor always exact,6 in 
practice it classifies effectively the methodology used in most contemporary models, and captures 
a marked methodological division that reinforces theoretical differences and perceptions for policy-
making.7 
The theoretical difference between the schools has at its heart a difference in the treatment of risk 
and uncertainty in investment and finance (Keynes 1921, Fontana 2008).8 Keynes describes risk as 
quantifiable probabilities of outcomes of an action (e.g. investment), while uncertainty is 
unquantifiable. In Post-Keynesian theory, it is assumed that investment takes place under 
fundamental uncertainty, which makes it impossible for agents to reliably estimate the likelihood 
of return on investment. Keynesian theory assumes that due to lack of detailed information, it is 
not possible for agents to devise a strategy that fully uses reliably all resources, as opposed to 
neoclassical theory, in which even under uncertainty, agents would find ways through markets to 
coordinate the use all resources. For example, in the non-equilibrium school, under uncertainty 
over variations of demand, the investor plans for spare production capacity, so that he/she can 
respond to sudden demand changes (Fontana 2008, Lavoie 2014). This implies that investment 
depends on investor and bank confidence in markets, and drives income and employment (or 
unemployment) of resources.  
Meanwhile, in pure equilibrium theory in its most basic form, income determines investment 
through the propensity to save. Since demand can be relied upon and be foreseen 
(probabilistically), capital is optimally planned and used. Thus, capital accumulation determines 
production, and the theory functions the other way around. Therefore, the different direction of 
                                                 
6 For instance, Goodwin (1982) model could be classified as Marxian although it uses some optimal conditions to yield a closed-form. 
7 We avoid the orthodox/heterodox terminology as it is applied to too many issues in economics (values, methods, traditions and 
ideology) and is thus insufficiently precise for our purposes, and it is only used by a small subset of practitioners. We use the 
equilibrium/non-equilibrium, optimisation/simulation and the demand-led/supply-led terminologies to refer to, respectively, the 
theoretical, methodological and flow of information aspects.  
8 Note that DSGE models do attempt to integrate uncertainty to macroeconomic modelling (Christiano et al. 2018). However, the 
uncertainty addressed is that which concerns the modeller’s knowledge, not the modelled agent’s knowledge and expectations, since 
the rational expectations assumption prevents systematic errors in agent predictions, making the predictions of agents the same as the 
model’s itself, on average. DSGE models possess the constraints discussed in this paper in the ‘equilibrium’ sections (see also Pesaran 
and Smith 1995). 
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economic causality in equilibrium and non-equilibrium theory is a consequence of their respective 
treatments of risk and uncertainty. 
A difference in philosophical interpretation also arises: in basic equilibrium theory, agents behave 
in a way that leads to maximal utility for all. This therefore identifies a normative or aspirational 
scenario, and deviations, ascribed to real-world effects and policy decisions, are discussed as 
distortions or frictions. Meanwhile, in non-equilibrium theory, no scenario is deemed more 
aspirational than any other; each scenario describes the economy in a different trajectory, and 
scenarios diverge from one another over time. 
2.2. TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IN CONTEMPORARY LOW-CARBON TRANSITION MODELS  
2.2.1. Taxonomy of theories and models used for informing climate policy and beyond  
We list representations of money, innovation, technology, methodology and the source of 
economic change in ten schools and research areas in economics, grouped into equilibrium and 
non-equilibrium (Table 1). This list is not exhaustive, but represents the main contemporary 
currents of economic thought. 
We furthermore classify current macroeconomic and macro-sectoral economic models along the 
categories of general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, macro-econometric, systems dynamics and 
agent-based (Table 2). Within each of these, sub-categories exist. We provide a taxonomy of 
approaches according to the types of assumptions adopted for the structure of technological 
change, its representation at the micro and macro levels, and their representation of the 
entrepreneur at both levels.  
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Table 1: Schools of economic thought. 
 School Name 
Micro-foundations: 
Rationality / Agent 
Money 
Parameter-
isation method 
Innovation 
Technology 
Economic change 
Eq
u
ili
b
ri
u
m
/S
u
p
p
ly
-l
e
d
 
N
eo
cl
as
si
ca
l 
Solow1 
Rational expectations/ 
Representative Agent 
Commodity Optimisation Exogenous 
Capital 
accumulation 
Endogenous 
Growth2 
Rational Expectations/ 
Representative Agent 
Commodity Optimisation 
Knowledge in 
production functions 
Capital & 
knowledge 
accumulation 
General3 
Equilibrium 
Rational Expectations/ 
Representative Agent 
Commodity Optimisation 
Knowledge in 
production 
functions, learning 
curves, knowledge 
spillovers10 
Capital & 
knowledge 
accumulation 
N
o
n
-e
q
u
ili
b
ri
u
m
/d
em
an
d
-l
e
d
 
P
o
st
-S
ch
u
m
et
er
ia
n
 Evolutionary 
Economics4 
Behavioural8 
Heterogeneous 
Asset  
(Credit creation) 
Dynamical 
systems, 
Historical 
approach9 
Knowledge 
networks, Diffusion,  
learning  
Entrepreneur, 
Innovation 
clustering, 
creative 
destruction 
Transitions 
Theory5 
Historical 
Technology 
Innovation 
Systems6 
Case studies 
P
o
st
-
K
ey
n
es
ia
n
7
 Horizontalists 
Behavioural8 
Heterogeneous 
Asset  
(Credit creation) 
Time series 
Econometrics 
Sectoral tech. 
progress functions  
Cumulative 
causation of 
knowledge 
accumulation 
Structuralists 
Behavioural8 Numerous agents -- Empirical -- -- 
Marxian Classes -- Econometrics -- -- 
Representative
Models 
1RICE/DICE (Nordhaus 2013), 2REMIND (PIK 2016), 3IMACLIM (CIRED 2018), AIM (NIES 2012), GEM-E3 (E3MLab 
2018a), 4Evolutionary Economics (Safarzyńska and van den Bergh 2010), 5Geels (Geels 2002), 6Technology Innovation 
Systems (Hekkert et al. 2007), 7E3ME-FTT (Mercure et al. 2018a), GINFORS (Lutz et al. 2009), Giraud stock-Flow 
(Giraud et al. 2016), DEFINE (Dafermos et al. 2017), MINSKY (Keen 1995), 8 Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979), Discrete choice theory (Domencich and McFadden 1975), 9historical approach (Freeman and Louçã 2001, Geels 
2002), 10 Note that although the method is in use (e.g. in GEM-E3), some but not all GE models feature learning 
curves or knowledge spillovers. 
 
We have classified the main methodologies in terms of their representation of energy-related 
innovation, and representation of agents, at the micro and macro levels. Here ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ 
are used to refer to the level of aggregation: ‘micro’ means for example distinguishing individual 
technologies (e.g. solar PV), while macro means modelling aggregates at the sectoral or economy-
wide level (e.g. the electricity or automotive sectors as whole). Innovation indicates 
representations of cost-reducing or productivity-enhancing activity, while agents refer to 
representations of decision-making and behaviour (e.g. investment decisions).  
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Table 2: Types of macro-models and summary of their assumptions regarding energy-related innovation and 
investment behaviour. 
 Assumption type Micro innovation Macro innovation Micro agent Macro agent 
Su
p
p
ly
-l
e
d
 /
 O
p
ti
m
is
at
io
n
 
Optimal growth1 
Does not have 
detailed 
disaggregated 
sectors 
Knowledge 
accumulation in 
economy 
production function 
Normative social planner optimising 
utility inter-temporally 
G
en
er
al
 E
q
u
ili
b
ri
u
m
 Computable 
General 
Equilibrium2 
Can be linked to 
detailed 
technology models 
Endogenous 
productivity in 
sectoral production 
functions 
Representative agent with rational 
expectations (deterministic) optimising 
utility, prices adjust to clear all markets 
Dynamic 
Stochastic 
General 
Equilibrium 
Can be linked to 
detailed 
technology models 
Exogenous 
technological 
change 
Heterogeneous stochastic representative 
agent  
Partial equilibrium 
Cost-optimisation3 
Learning curves, 
exogenous 
diffusion rates, 
vintage capital 
Productivity not 
defined, can be 
linked to a CGE 
model 
Can be 
heterogeneous, 
market segments 
The normative 
social planner 
D
e
m
an
d
-l
ed
 /
 S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Macro-econometric4 
Can be linked to 
detailed 
technology models 
Technology 
progress indicators 
(fn. of cumulative 
investment) 
Can be linked to 
detailed 
technology models 
Investment 
behaviour derived 
econometrically 
Sy
st
em
s 
D
yn
am
ic
s 
Discrete 
choice5 
Vintage capital 
(fleets), learning 
curves 
Productivity not 
defined, but can be 
linked to any 
macro-model 
Multinomial logit 
regressions, 
heterogeneous 
agents 
Can be linked to 
macro-model 
Diffusion6 
Selection-diffusion 
evolutionary 
model, learning 
curves 
Can be linked to a 
path-dependent 
economic model 
Decision-making 
under bounded 
rationality, social 
influence 
Can be linked to 
macro-model 
A
ge
n
t-
b
as
ed
 
Sectoral7 
Vintage capital 
(fleets), learning 
curves 
Can be linked to a 
path-dependent 
economic model 
Decision-making 
under bounded 
rationality, social 
influence 
Can be linked to 
macro-model 
Representative 
Models 
Model examples: (1) RICE/DICE (Nordhaus 2013), FUND (Anthoff and Tol 2014), QUEST (DG ECFIN 2015), (2) 
GEM-E3 (E3MLab 2018a), IMACLIM (CIRED 2018), (3) MESSAGE (IIASA 2014), (PNNL 2017), TIMES (IEA/ETSAP 
2016), PRIMES (E3MLab 2018b), (4) E3ME (Mercure et al. 2018a), GINFORS (Lutz et al. 2009) Giraud stock-Flow 
(Giraud et al. 2016), DEFINE (Dafermos et al. 2017), EIRIN (Monasterolo and Raberto 2018) (5) IMAGE-TIMER 
(Bouwman et al. 2006) (6) FTT (Mercure et al. 2014) (7) MATISSE (Köhler et al. 2009). 
 
 
Representations of endogenous innovation and induced/endogenous technological change 
(ITC/ETC) were explored extensively a decade ago, and applied to energy and climate policy (see 
IMCP, Edenhofer et al. 2006). The result was that, according to the models, the capital costs and 
hence investment requirements to roll out technological change become less over time if learning-
by-doing and technological progress is allowed to take place endogenously in those models.  
The change towards ITC/ETC has been crucial: in earlier neoclassical models with inter-temporal 
optimisation, the representative agent was optimising utility over a trend of productivity 
predetermined with certainty. This had the perverse effect that the representative agent could 
anticipate future gains in efficiency and so postpone investing in low-carbon energy if this was not 
cost-optimal. The presence of so-called back-stop technologies 9  also had the same effect, 
                                                 
9 A backstop technology is a hypothetical future technology that, assuming the consumer is willing to pay a high enough price, could 
provide infinite amounts of clean energy (e.g. solar photovoltaic or nuclear fusion). 
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promising future solutions that would appear with certainty once made economical. This in general 
meant that pre-ETC model results were to a great extent determined by exogenous assumptions  
(Grubb et al. 2002). With ITC/ETC, results emerged regarding the clustering of different possible 
types of optimal path-dependent states of the energy system, whether high or low-carbon 
(Gritsevskyi and Nakićenovic 2000). 
Exogenous productivity has been equally problematic in Post-Keynesian / Post-Schumpeterian 
simulation models. For example, if the efficiency of new energy-using technology did not 
endogenously respond to a change in prices, models would predict continuous slowdowns of 
energy-based service demand (e.g. transport, energy intensive goods, and perhaps economic 
growth) in scenarios of increasing energy prices, something not observed in reality (Grubb et al. 
2014 p. 209, Grubb et al. 2018). In reality, price rises incentivise investment in higher efficiency and 
faster technological turnover, while price falls do not imply technology regression (though they may 
encourage behaviour that uses more energy, see Grubb et al. 2014).10  
However, at the time of these modelling innovations, there was no consensus on the meaning of 
economic costs, an ongoing issue (see Grubb et al. 2014 ch. 11). Indeed, in some studies, costs are 
identified with total energy system costs, in other cases with additional investment costs, and yet 
in other cases, with changes in GDP or changes in (conceptualised) utility or welfare (which is still 
the case, see e.g. IPCC 2014b ch. 6). 
Many contemporary models now feature representations of some degree of ETC/ITC in principle, 
although it is not always clear to which degree these mechanisms are relied upon in studies, as they 
are not always reported, an issue that can lead to ambiguity for interpretation. 11  These 
representations can be radically different, tracing back again to basic economic theory, namely the 
neoclassical, Post-Keynesian and Post-Schumpeterian schools of thought. 
2.2.2. Innovation and technological change in macro-economic models 
Consistent with the underlying philosophical assumptions about flows of causality in economic 
systems, the two theoretical paradigms discussed in section 2.1 embody the following, opposite, 
directions of causation with respect to the treatment of innovation and technological change:  
a. In the equilibrium/supply-led paradigm, the representative household chooses between 
consuming its income now or in the future (i.e. to save). The financial resources made 
available by saving in the present are exhausted in investment, increasing (with certainty) 
the production capacity and productivity for supplying consumption in the future, through 
the accumulation of physical capital and knowledge. Capital resources in each year are 
finite, and are allocated to their most efficient use (that provides the highest rate of return). 
Because in deterministic equilibrium models investment outcomes are known with 
                                                 
10 Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) found, using a CGE model, that the oil price shocks of the 70’ suppressed total factor productivity 
growth temporarily. This result, however, is fully dependent on the assumption of crowding-out discussed below, as the dynamics involve 
changes in savings, originating from changes in consumption, that are forced by model construction to generate equal changes in 
investment. Without crowding-out, lower (higher) consumption would not be directly linked to higher (lower) investment.  
11 ETC/ITC generates difficulties when introduced in optimisation algorithms, and therefore, it is known that such features, although 
available, are sometimes (or potentially often) switched off in order for modellers to improve model stability and/or reduce 
computational time (as inferred from our private communications with modellers). Thus, while nearly all model descriptions and papers 
claim or have claimed representations of learning curves, it is currently not possible to know when they are used and when not. 
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certainty, only the efficient portfolios are selected (technology risk-returns relationships 
are exogenously specified). 
b. In the non-equilibrium/demand-led paradigm, the entrepreneur decides under 
fundamental uncertainty whether to borrow funds for investing in production capital, R&D 
and technology. When banks agree to offer loans, money is created in the form of deposits 
(the finance for investment), and saving and investment both increase equally. Since 
investment is not constrained by households’ savings, this increases debt and income 
simultaneously (unless the economy is operating at full employment).  Individual 
investments may or may not lead to their intended productivity improvements and profit; 
at the aggregate level, however, they all contribute to an increasing body of knowledge. 
Economic growth can be driven by increasing debt (although not indefinitely). The 
clustering of innovation leads to economic cycles. 
In computational implementations, the current model zoology is not so clear-cut, and many models 
are hybrid (e.g. IMACLIM (CIRED 2018) and GEM-E3 (E3MLab 2018a), see the SM for details). In 
particular, when equilibrium models feature elements that cannot be changed even when it would 
be optimal to change them (e.g. physical capital with long lifetimes, sticky prices), solutions are 
‘sub-optimal’ and models deviate from ‘aspirational’ efficient markets towards descriptions that 
more closely reflect real-world ‘imperfections’. Furthermore, the representative agent can be given 
limited foresight (often called the ‘myopic mode’, relaxing the constraints of rational expectations). 
Finally, if a financial sector is introduced, savings can be borrowed from abroad and repaid in the 
future (e.g. in GEM-E3-FIT).  
A similar division of paradigms also exists in the bottom-up technology modelling literature: an 
optimisation versus simulation methodological divide, with a large number of partial equilibrium 
cost-optimisation models of technology being in use and forming the most common model type. 
Furthermore, the adoption and diffusion of innovations are processes that are not modelled very 
well in the community: energy models are found to produce typically pessimistic outcomes in 
comparison to observed diffusion trends (Wilson et al. 2013). This points to a clear need to improve 
this representation, which is currently addressed in ongoing research initiatives (McCollum et al. 
2016, Mercure et al. 2016b, McCollum et al. 2018a). 
2.3. THE ROLE OF MONEY AND FINANCE IN CURRENT MACRO-MODELS 
A transition to a decarbonised energy system requires significant amounts of investment in energy 
R&D, supply chains, infrastructure and physical capital, which could substantially exceed what 
might have been invested in this sector in an otherwise business as usual scenario. Even in contexts 
favourable for entrepreneurs to invest in low-carbon technology, they require access to funds in 
order for the transition to take place (Pollitt and Mercure 2017). Such investments could, in 
principle, displace other (arguably more productive) investments, a detrimental ‘crowding-out’ 
effect. A debate also exists as to whether government or other finance of innovation in the early 
stages of the innovation chain ‘crowds-out’ or ‘crowds-in’ other private finance in later stages 
(Mazzucato 2011, Popp and Newell 2012, Hottenrott and Rexhäuser 2015, Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk 2017, 2018). 
In the context of this work, we use a general meaning of ‘crowding-out’: when an agent 
(government, firms, individuals) borrow(s) significant amounts of funds in order to invest into 
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productive capital, this demand could (under certain conditions) divert funds that otherwise would 
have been used elsewhere in the economy, by bidding upwards the price of finance (the interest 
rate), i.e. pricing out competing projects. Crowding-out can also apply to physical capital or labour, 
in which cases prices or wages clear the respective markets.  
The potential extent of ‘crowding-out’ depends on the amounts of funds available in the economy, 
and the degree to which crowding-out is assumed to take place in the model is determinant for 
model results. 
This subject is once more fundamental to economic theory, where we again have the same two 
paradigms, (a) equilibrium and (b) non-equilibrium, this time with a focus on money. For policy 
contexts favourable for entrepreneurs to invest significant amounts of funds into low-carbon 
ventures (e.g. due to carbon pricing), outcomes will differ. 
In the equilibrium/supply-led paradigm, investment is determined by saving, which is a fixed 
proportion of income. Entrepreneurs compete for this restricted finite amount made available 
through financial markets/institutions. Demand for money by different sectors at the same time is 
cleared by the rate of interest, i.e. some entrepreneurs are outbid by the willingness to pay of 
others, and are thus crowded-out. Money is a commodity in a finite quantity chosen by the central 
bank; if the central bank prints more money, the value of money decreases proportionally (the 
‘neutrality of money’). Thus equilibrium models need not have any representation of money or 
inflation, but only of relative prices. In the climate policy context, low-carbon investments 
promoted by policy crowd out other investments key to the economy. This leads to 
underinvestment in other key sectors for growth, leading to less productive use of capital, higher 
cost of capital and hence overall high costs to the economy. 
In the non-equilibrium/demand-led paradigm, investment is unrestricted and determined only by 
the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest and the willingness of banks to lend (unless funds are re-
invested profits), determined by the perception by banks of the credit-worthiness of entrepreneurs. 
Banks are not solely intermediaries, but have a balance sheet and strategy. Banks borrow from each 
other, to diversify risk, and to/from the central bank, to gain reserves necessary to underwrite their 
lending activities (they minimise/optimise the risk and return of their balance sheet, constrained 
by financial regulation). Money, whether in paper form, or in commercial bank accounts, is a form 
of asset-liability pair, between two entities, the bank (debtor) and the owner (creditor). Thus all 
forms of money are financial instruments that can be created or destroyed by financial institutions 
(Lavoie 2014, McLeay et al. 2014a, Schumpeter 2014). Money creation is thus not constrained by 
savings, but only limited by the supply of credible lucrative ventures (in the prevailing context). In 
times of economic optimism with high returns on investment, banks expand lending, leading to 
growth and prosperity; in times of high perceived risk of default, financial institutions restrict 
lending, leading to economic recession. Thus GDP can increase in periods of optimism, high 
borrowing and investment, while it can slump in periods of pessimism, credit rationing and low 
confidence. 
In line with those perspectives, equilibrium models take the premise that banks only play the role 
of intermediary between creditors and lenders, and that their role as money creators is neglected. 
Current non-equilibrium models, when they lack explicit representations of the financial sector, 
assume the allocation of finance ‘on demand’ by banks exogenously (i.e. how much money is 
created) according to how much investment is required. Notwithstanding the overwhelming role 
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that money and finance play in driving low-carbon transitions, the modelling literature that 
provides a satisfactory representation of such monetary elements is extremely scarce.  
 
3. RESULTS: IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL CHOICE FOR CLIMATE-RELATED POLICY-MAKING AND 
MACRO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
3.1. MODEL OUTCOMES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS BY MODEL TYPE 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of GDP changes, relative to a baseline, of a policy-driven sustainability transition for the two groups 
of modelling schools of thought, equilibrium and non-equilibrium, in the current state-of-the-art. In this hypothetical 
example, a sustainability transition is financed (self-financed or via borrowing) from time zero until the vertical dashed 
line, after which low-carbon finance stops (figure co-designed by the authors).  
It is to be noted that for equilibrium models, recovery post-transition is strongly related to innovation processes such as 
productivity change, which mitigate the negative effects. However, even without representations of learning-by-doing 
and innovation, equilibrium models may still display a recovery post-transition due to processes such as reductions in 
fossil-fuel imports. Meanwhile, without representations of debt burdens, non-equilibrium models would not likely display 
a convergence post-transition.  
We present our key result and message in Figure 2, based on work using state-of-the-art models 
from both sides of the theoretical spectrum. In the case of equilibrium models (red curves), with 
crowding-out of investment, an investment-intensive energy transition displaces resources that 
would have been used more productively elsewhere in the economy, leading to a sub-optimal 
equilibrium at lower GDP in the short run.12 As the transition completes itself and high carbon 
equipment becomes replaced by low-carbon technology, this displacement ceases and investment 
returns to normal (undistorted) purposes. In the long run, with learning-by-doing, productivity 
increases, while lower operational expenses (e.g. fuel costs) may be incurred, and GDP recovers, or 
may even be improved above the baseline due to improved productivity and trade balance.  
                                                 
12 Unless, for instance, if the baseline initially included distortions that were then removed in a mitigation scenario. 
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We note that a reverse ‘crowding-out’ effect can also arise in equilibrium in cases where policy 
forces the shutdown of an economic sector (e.g. oil and gas during decarbonisation). In the 
equilibrium case, this frees-up capital, which, with optimal allocation, increases the capital available 
for investment in other sectors, thereby compensating for the output loss. Thus, the effect goes 
both ways.  
In the case of non-equilibrium models without crowding-out (green curves), an investment-
intensive energy transition program is predicted to create additional employment and to boost GDP 
in the short to medium run, due to a boost in employment stemming from higher investment (which 
is not offset by the impact of higher interest rates since financing is assumed to be abundant). It is 
followed by a possible reduction in macro-economic gains or even decline in the long run as debts 
are paid back, depending on debt servicing conditions. This is due to money being created by banks 
for investment in the early phase, which funds construction and results in activity across the 
economy, but also increases the debt burden, which remains in the longer term. For similar reasons 
as in equilibrium models, long-lasting productivity increases typically remain in the long run, 
following cumulative investments in better technology and equipment. These can offset the burden 
of debt repayment. 
The ‘reverse crowding-out’ effect observed in equilibrium models also does not occur in non-
equilibrium models. In the latter, losses of market share in particular sectors means that related 
capital and investment opportunities are truly lost and not replaced, leading to job and income 
losses despite the aggregate possible positive impact of investment-led growth in other sectors. 
This means that rapid structural change instead leads to stranded capital, for example stranded 
fossil fuel assets (Mercure et al. 2018b), which do not arise in equilibrium models.  
This explains why models of different classes exhibit essentially opposite outcomes for the 
macroeconomics of an energy sustainability transition (i.e. GDP and employment). Uncertainty also 
behaves differently: in equilibrium, due to the use of optimisation, uncertainty of solutions is 
linearly related to the uncertainty in parameters, as it primarily represents the gradient of the 
optimisation function in the vicinity of the optimal point. In contrast, non-equilibrium models are 
strongly path-dependent. This means that uncertainty on parameters accumulates over simulation 
time, as path-dependence generates alternate scenarios that diverge from each other, differing 
minimally in the short run but becoming significantly different in the long run. As such, model 
outcomes in the far future are more uncertain than those in the near future.13 This property is 
standard for complex systems, and arises for example strongly in climate models. 
3.2. IS A CONVERGENCE OF MODELS POSSIBLE? 
To move beyond conceptual arguments about different economic paradigms and the models that 
result, the authors have worked together in enhancing two models based on these different 
fundamental perspectives – equilibrium (GEM-E3)14 and non-equilibrium (E3ME15, see the SM for 
details on both models) - and focused on how to represent the crucial processes of innovation and 
                                                 
13 Lower apparent uncertainty bounds in equilibrium models should not be understood as better treatment of real-world uncertainty, 
but rather, as the uncertainty that can be represented in optimisation algorithms, which are not strongly path-dependent. I.e. increasing 
uncertainty bounds stem from path-dependence. Path-dependence is typically generated by processes with increasing returns such as 
learning-by-doing, diffusion dynamics etc (Arthur et al. 1987, Arthur 1989, Gritsevskyi and Nakićenovic 2000). 
14 GEM-E3-FIT: General Equilibrium Model for Energy Economy & Environment with Financial and Technical progress modules. 
15 E3ME-FTT: Energy-Economy-Environment Macro-Econometric model with Future Technology Transformations 
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finance applied to climate change mitigation.  The collaboration was facilitated by the fact that both 
models already had an advanced treatment of induced innovation, and have been given similar 
parameterisation inputs.  We focus here on the representation of finance, which we argue is the 
more fundamental reason for persistent differences in the magnitude and direction of model 
results.  
These two models make explicit the mark-up faced by borrowers over a ‘benchmark’ interest rate, 
where the mark-up is intended to capture the risks that are specific to the project / industry sector 
/ country.  One such risk is the capacity of borrowers to service additional debt, and the models 
construct estimates of the existing debt carried by each industry (or other institutional sector) 
based on the history of previous investment and assumptions for how that investment was 
financed.  The models differ in their determination of the benchmark interest rate, reflecting their 
respective origins in the equilibrium (GEM-E3-FIT) and non-equilibrium (E3ME-FTT) traditions. 
In both models, the developments allow financial constraints to be explored explicitly in scenarios.  
For example, a scenario of rapid decarbonisation in power generation would be associated with a 
higher rate of investment and a higher level of debt carried by the firms undertaking the 
investment.  This will have the effect of making the power generation sector a riskier prospect for 
lenders, reflected in a higher cost of capital and a higher price ultimately passed through to 
consumers.  This can be mitigated by policy, for example through some form of public underwriting 
of the higher risk (transferring the risk, and the cost to taxpayers). 
In summary, in equilibrium models, the factor limiting the total amount of borrowing is the interest 
rate, which clears the market. In non-equilibrium theory, credit-worthiness is what ultimately 
determines the confidence of banks to invest.  
Based on comparison of preliminary results from the models E3ME-FTT and GEM-E3-FIT, 
incorporating the developments described above, the two models appear to converge in their 
outcomes.  As discussions and debates intensify regarding investment levels required in the context 
of the low-carbon transition (IPCC 2018a, McCollum et al. 2018b), it is possible that improving the 
representations of money and finance in both model types could bring much needed coherence 
and clarity in the macroeconomic messages conveyed to energy and climate policy makers. 
3.3. CLARIFYING THE PURPOSE OF MODELS: NORMATIVE OR POSITIVE? 
The use or not of an optimising representative agent or social planner construct, as a model 
representation of human populations, raises questions as to the nature, purpose and methodology 
of models deployed in climate policy making, which appear to be confused: are they normative 
(identifying best configurations or strategies in order to make recommendations, i.e. what agents 
ought to do) or positive (describing observed reality, i.e. what agents are observed to do)? By 
definition, an economic allocation identified by systems optimisation is the best possible allocation 
(under certain chosen criteria and constraints, and according to existing knowledge). The finding 
that an optimal resource allocation is not achieved due to frictions and market failures, ultimately 
reflects a normative philosophy of science. Meanwhile, allocations that are identified and described 
because they are considered likely to arise, whether good or bad, reflect a descriptive scientific 
approach. The science philosophy question debated here concerns what the research question is, 
whether agents are understood to behave in such a way that optimal outcomes are realised in 
scenarios, and whether those scenarios are in themselves recommendations or descriptions of 
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reality. Unfortunately, there exists a deep lack of clarity in the position of modellers on that 
question in the field. 
Scenarios calculated using normative optimisation models are by definition ‘possible/plausible’, but 
they are not necessarily ‘likely’. Specifically, it is not possible to determine the likelihood of optimal 
scenarios occurring in reality, simply because, even if agents were inclined to contribute to an 
optimal economic allocation, they would have no way of finding out, individually, which strategies 
would make the correct contribution (Kirman 1992). The degree of control and coordination 
necessary exceeds the capacity of law-makers. Naturally, what is analysed in optimisation scenarios 
are the differences from the optimum, not the optimum itself, while in descriptive models, it is 
differences from current trajectory that are analysed. Thus, when dealing with optimal scenarios, 
the difference between the ‘baseline’ (no intervention) trajectory and an optimal situation (albeit 
with market failures) is sometimes blurred. If not treated carefully, the interpretation of 
optimisation results could pre-determine the result, in that any market distortion of the baseline 
scenario would automatically lead, by construction, to a detrimental performance outcome, even 
though it corrects market failures (for instance, its impact on GDP). 
Furthermore, a danger exists in interpreting results of optimisation models – inherently normative 
– in a descriptive philosophy. For example, cost-optimisation and pure representative agent 
equilibrium models offer the attractive but potentially misleading suggestion that pricing policies 
are the best way to correct market failures such as climate change, since agents, when assumed to 
behave optimally, always find the best possible use of resources according to prices. Indeed, many 
such models equate ‘marginal/social cost of carbon’ (what the models produce from a constraint 
or externality) with ‘carbon price’ (the assumed policy instrument). However, policy practice has 
shown that pricing is usually not the only policy lever to be known to work: while pricing policies 
do offer incentives to correct market failures, their likelihood of achieving actual normative 
objectives is not as clear as basic equilibrium theory would suggest.16 Finding out whether carbon 
pricing is likely to reach its stated objective requires studying how agents take decisions, including 
how they take account of such incentives (Knobloch and Mercure 2016). The distinction between 
normative and descriptive approaches to science is not frequently identified, but it is crucial if one 
is to understand the meaning of model results. Ultimately, the danger lies in the interpretation of 
model results in terms of causality between intervention and outcome. 
The normative/descriptive paradigms are reflected in model behaviour. In optimisation-based 
models, allocations at each point in time modelled are in equilibrium steady states, and thus only 
change when exogenous variables change, as for example, population, regulations, trade 
agreements, the price of carbon, technology costs or taxation. The converse is that configurations 
do not change unless an external parameter changes (e.g. the price of an internalised externality). 
This has the result that, for climate change mitigation, additional emissions abatement only takes 
place when the (shadow) price of carbon increases.17 Low-carbon technology diffusion stops if the 
                                                 
16 Notably, most optimisation models assume and require the application of a carbon price to all sources of carbon emissions, including 
those in which other policy instruments are currently used and for which no plans currently exist in most countries to use emissions 
trading or carbon taxes (e.g. personal mobility, household heating, agriculture). The assumed effectiveness of a carbon price to reduce 
emissions in consumer-based sectors is at best conjectural, and not informed by extensive behavioural research.  
17 With the exception of policy instruments involving setting standards which optimisation models reflect by reducing the menu of 
technological choices, eliminating those polluting technologies that do not meet the standards imposed. In this case emission reductions 
can still occur as a response to setting standards without changes in the carbon price. 
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(real) price of carbon or other incentives becomes constant.18 In the scenario database of the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), this leads some models to report very high carbon prices, up to 
$10,000/tCO2 or more (IPCC 2014a, 2018b), that are required to abate the last remaining sources 
of emissions in the marginal abatement cost curve. However,  in a largely decarbonised world, as 
carbon markets decline in relevance, and older socio-technical and industrial systems based on 
fossil fuels are abandoned and replaced by newer innovative low-carbon systems, it is not clear 
how, in reality, the carbon price would behave (Vogt-Schilb et al. 2018).   
In a non-equilibrium perspective, model states typically evolve without end even if the policy 
context does not change, in part pre-conditioned by their history, momentum and inertia. Thus, 
technological change does not solely take place when relative prices change, but instead, happens 
continuously, since the methodology does not involve searching for a steady state. In this paradigm, 
taxes create incentives to re-orient an ever-changing system towards a new course.19 Indeed, the 
system may be permanently altered and the policies which drove the transition to a new path may 
then become either embedded, or redundant (or possibly both). Unchanging but significant policies 
are not in this case equivalent to zero incentive.  
This difference in model behaviour matches a divide within the policy sphere as well. The world of 
climate policy is divided along two lines of thought. On the one hand, in the equilibrium paradigm, 
policy-makers see carbon pricing as a tool for re-allocating scarce funds to fix a market failure, 
climate change, focusing on the marginal abatement cost and social cost of carbon. As a result, it is 
generally argued that linking or merging carbon markets increases market efficiency. 
In the non-equilibrium perspective, energy and climate policy-makers see the carbon price as a 
signal instrument to incentivise faster economy-wide innovation and low-carbon technological 
change. The experienced and expected future price of carbon must be sufficiently high to 
communicate the current and future value of low-carbon investment to firms (including R&D), but 
it is not the only policy available. Regulation can play an important role, allowing a lower carbon 
tax, using for instance technology or sectoral policies, including both ‘push’, and ‘pull’ policies such 
as the combination of R&D, feed-in tariffs and regulatory changes which have driven the revolution 
in renewable energy technologies. It is then argued that different national innovation systems, 
facing different contexts, are likely to require different magnitudes of incentives (e.g. what creates 
incentive for R&D, innovation and investment in China is not the same as in Germany), and thus 
carbon markets should not necessarily be linked internationally to accelerate decarbonisation. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
Innovation is one of the determining factors in the long run costs of climate change mitigation, a 
finding that may also be relevant for other major structural economic transformation processes. 
Climate policies that stimulate innovation have a plausible prospect of yielding economic benefits, 
but are also as likely to generate economic challenges. In fact, climate policies  may well be found 
                                                 
18 In models without non-convexities, technology composition is a unique function of the carbon price.  
19 Diffusion is not a simple function of the carbon price or other incentives: increasing the carbon price does not always incentivise the 
same number of agents deciding to purchase a particular durable good; it depends on history. But also, due to inertia in diffusion, an 
unchanging (real) carbon price/tax signal can sustain low-carbon technology diffusion. 
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to generate both at the same time (for instance, see Mercure et al. 2018b), depending on sectors 
and regions, the net effect depending on contextual policy design and mode of implementation.  
Climate and energy policy assessment often involves the use of large complex multi-sectoral 
computational economic, energy technology and environmental models, to carry out quantitative 
analysis. However, innovation, and the financing requirements of capital-intensive systems 
transformations, remains generally not well represented in models deployed for informing climate 
and low-carbon energy innovation policy planning. Furthermore, long-run models that do not 
explicitly include endogenous innovation have a higher chance of yielding potentially erroneous 
results which could become quickly outdated (notably technology costs). 
The outcomes of these models are tied to their assumptions and theoretical underpinnings. In order 
to overcome the much-referenced “black-box” critique, it is therefore crucial to lay out these 
assumptions and theoretical details in a way that makes understanding the results as easy as 
possible. Since estimates of economic impacts of policies tend to have an important impact on the 
political economy of climate policy, greater attention to the theories, empirics and modelling of 
finance is required, in both equilibrium and non-equilibrium types of models. This paper contributes 
towards this effort of improving the transparency of sophisticated model mechanisms and the 
drivers of their outcomes, when applied in assessing climate and energy policy impacts.  
Depending on the model choice, model results imply that the structural characteristic of the climate 
change mitigation problem may or may not be one of burden-sharing to deliver a global public 
good. Instead, they could rather point towards the challenge of crafting smart domestic policies 
combined with international mechanisms for accelerating low-carbon technology and policy 
diffusion, and for reducing the cost of capital by cementing policy commitments in international 
agreements. Ultimately, with further development, models may over time depart from the 
standard framing of climate policy as a prisoner’s dilemma, replacing it by another type of game 
with rules based on the consequences of financing low-carbon innovation and structural change. 
The observed differences between the models in their treatment of innovation, money and finance 
reflect the lack of consensus among economists and social scientists. While both approaches are 
theoretically rigorous and self-consistent, it is important for policy-makers to have some insight 
into this state of conflicting knowledge. It needs to be recognised by both the policy and modelling 
communities that this schism exists, that representations are incomplete, and therefore that 
further research is critically needed in order to further our ability to effectively inform climate 
policy-making.  Otherwise, model types can be chosen solely according to whether their results 
support or not particular political platforms. In this context, it is reasonable to make the 
recommendation that, in the interests of transparency for policy-makers and researchers, all 
modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of 
finance and innovation, whether they use learning-curves, or represent finance explicitly, 
something not usually currently done. 
Finally, and most importantly, it emerges from our study that developing representations of the 
monetary and financial sectors is crucial in models used for studying the economic impacts of 
energy system transformations and emissions reductions. Model differences completely hinge on 
whether crowding-out of financial resources takes place or not, which thus needs empirical 
verification. In addition to this, improving representations of behavioural features in agent 
decision-making (e.g. technology adoption, bank lending) can improve the accuracy of models to 
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assess the effectiveness of proposed policies. It is thus imperative that in existing science-policy 
interfaces, in which policy-makers routinely commission modelling studies, strong incentives are 
given to modellers to improve their representations of money and finance. We argue that this is 
critical in order to clarify model outcomes with respect to policy proposals, and attempt to reduce 
model uncertainty, robustness of results, and spur a conciliatory methodological dialogue.  
Our explanation of the theoretical and methodological origins of model differences can help policy-
makers and policy-analysts understand what broad mechanisms the models have and have not 
taken into account when interpreting the results of empirical policy analyses. Our analysis may also 
help shape the future direction of research and development in theory and models that are used 
for the analysis of energy and climate policies. Our analysis could in fact be generalised to the 
macroeconomic impacts of any type of technological transition (notably, the on-going transition 
towards automation and artificial intelligence). We trust that the knowledge reviewed here can 
help not only build a new research agenda, but also, shape the direction of enquiry in climate policy 
assessment. 
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